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A Closer Look
Assistance Programs  
in the Wake of the Crisis
By Richard G. Anderson and Charles S. Gascon
D
uring  the  financial  crisis  of  2007-2009,  the  Treasury,  the  Federal 
Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) extended 
unprecedented amounts of assistance to banks, government housing agen-
cies, auto manufacturers, individual homeowners and others.  Controversy 
surrounds such assistance.  Opponents pejoratively refer to the assistance as 
“bailouts,” arguing that billions of tax dollars were given to poorly managed 
but politically well-connected firms.  They dismiss assertions that millions 
of jobs would have been lost for as long as a decade if certain large firms had 
ceased operation, believing that American entrepreneurs would have quickly 
started new businesses to employ such workers.  Proponents argue the assis-
tance was carefully structured, was provided primarily to viable firms whose 
principal sin was to be adversely affected by the financial crisis and, in cases 
of assistance to insolvent firms, was carefully collateralized so as to recover 
the maximum amounts after the crisis.  Further, they argue, assistance in 
a panic (such as the autumn of 2008) is unquestionably the correct policy 
because a shallower recession and faster recovery benefit all American wage 
earners—and taxpayers.  The truth, of course, is somewhere in between. Are Bailouts Ever Wise?
A well-functioning (and well-regulated) 
financial system is essential in any economy 
that seeks to provide its citizens a high 
standard of living.  Yet, inherent in financial 
systems is risk, including the risk of major 
financial panics.  At such times, wisely 
administered government assistance is essen-
tial for both financial and nonfinancial firms. 
Not all bailouts are wise.  A firm that fails 
during normal economic times due to poor 
management, inadequate capital investment 
or excessive risk-taking should be allowed 
to fail (absent concerns regarding national 
security).  To do otherwise is the equivalent 
of counseling managers and entrepreneurs 
that taxpayers stand ready to backstop their 
failures.
But failure during periods of extreme 
financial stress differs.  The historical  
record suggests that judicious “bailouts”  
(we prefer the term “assistance”) during 
periods of financial stress are economically 
efficient and can benefit both employees  
and taxpayers. 
Critics of assistance argue that prudent 
managers of both financial and nonfinan-
cial firms should maintain adequate 
liquidity at all times so as to survive any 
adverse shock—if not, then failure is their 
proper Darwinian fate, and the economy is 
strengthened by their demise.  For modern 
economies, this argument is naïve—and 
false.  The simplest argument is the most 
powerful:  Virtually all businesses depend 
on borrowing capital against collateral, but 
in times of financial stress it often is impos-
sible to determine prices for such collateral.  
This observation underlies Walter Bagehot’s 
dictum in his 1873 book Lombard Street 
that in times of financial crisis a central 
bank must lend against any and all collat-
eral, even if its value may be questionable.
1  
Assistance is wise until such time as cooler 
heads, in less tumult, can sort through  
the problem.
Often overlooked by these same critics is 
the alternative:  an even more-heavily regu-
lated economy, so battened-down against all 
perils that it fails to provide the maximum 
standard of living for its citizens.  Yes, assis-
tance programs of the past couple of years 
have placed large sums of taxpayer money at 
risk—but it must be remembered that these 
firms employ taxpayers, buy products and 
services from other taxpayers, and are owned 
by taxpayers. 
Assistance programs, even in financial 
crises, should be judicious, transparent and 
granted at arm’s length as much as possible.  
Legitimate questions can be asked whether 
terms of the 2007-2009 assistance were suf-
ficiently onerous to ward off moral hazard.  
We believe they were.  In many cases, firms’ 
owners (the shareholders) were wiped out 
and senior managers were replaced.  Admit-
tedly, in other cases (and especially cases 
where banks borrowed from the Federal 
Reserve), senior managers and stockholders 
remain whole, or nearly so. 
How Costly Are Bailouts?
A person who receives his information 
primarily from news broadcasts might 
be forgiven for believing that “trillions of 
dollars” of taxpayer funds have been lost in 
bailouts.  In fact, the assistance programs of 
the Federal Reserve and FDIC have earned 
significant profits, and the Treasury’s pro-
grams—except for those related directly to 
the housing markets—are projected to incur 
no more than small losses.  Significant losses, 
as we discuss later, are confined to the federal 
housing government-sponsored enterprises 
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) and to the 
efforts to assist individual mortgage holders 
threatened with foreclosure. 
At their core, assistance programs are of 
value to firms (and the economy) because 
they buy risk (that is, bear risk) at prices that 
the free-market, during times of financial 
crisis, is unwilling to pay.  (An assistance 
program that places no taxpayer funds at 
risk is useless to the economy.)  Measured 
by the aggregate number of dollars initially 
set aside, Treasury, Federal Reserve and 
FDIC assistance programs risked nearly 
$3 trillion.  Federal Reserve short-term 
collateralized lending to banks comprised 
approximately half.  The Treasury operated 
13 programs of varying sizes, all funded by 
Not all bailouts are wise.  A firm that fails during normal 
economic times due to poor management, inadequate  
capital investment or excessive risk-taking should be allowed  
to fail (absent concerns regarding national security). ... But 
failure during periods of extreme financial stress differs.
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the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram (TARP) funds authorized by Congress 
in late September 2008. 
The Federal Reserve operated two broad 
categories of programs: lending to deposi-
tory institutions and extraordinary lending 
to nondepository financial institutions.  Fed 
lending to depository institutions was at mar-
ket interest rates and fully collateralized.  In a 
recent study, the Congressional Budget Office 
concluded that these programs provided no 
subsidy to banks because the interest rate 
was set in an open auction.
2  Some critics 
have argued that Fed lending “bailed out” 
imprudent banks, whose managers had over-
invested in high-yielding but illiquid assets.  
It may be true for a few banks, but there is no 
evidence that it is true for many. 
The FDIC initiated its principal program,  
the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program, on Oct. 14, 2008.  One part of 
that program provided unlimited deposit 
insurance for certain noninterest-bearing 
accounts, usually held by businesses.  Its 
intent was to calm fears that depositors 
might move deposits from smaller to larger 
banks (perceiving these as less likely to be 
allowed to fail) or might move deposits from 
banks into money market mutual funds 
after the regulators had provided de facto 
unlimited insurance to these funds.  The 
second feature of the FDIC program was to 
allow banks that found debt markets inhos-
pitable to roll maturing senior debt into new 
issues fully guaranteed by the FDIC.
3
Figure 1 summarizes into eight categories  
the assistance programs of the Federal 
Reserve, Treasury and FDIC.
4  For each cat-
egory, the blue bar measures the total funds 
authorized, the red bar shows current outlays 
and the green bar shows the projected net 
gain (positive values) or loss (negative values).   
In most categories, the net outlay (taxpayer 
cost) is small relative to initial program size.
Assistance to Banks
Assistance to banks was in three parts.  
First, the Treasury advanced $205 billion 
between October 2008 and December 2009 
to 707 financial institutions in 48 states, 
in amounts ranging from $300,000 to $25 
million, and at interest rates between 5 and 
7.7 percent (increasing to 9 to 13.8 percent 
after five years).  Each advance was secured 
by preferred stock or debt securities, plus 
warrants that permitted the Treasury to buy 
common shares.  As of Sept. 30, 2010, three-
quarters ($152 billion) had been repaid, plus 
an additional $21 billion had been received  
in dividends and interest and from the sale  
of warrants; $3 billion had been written off 
due to failed companies.
5
The second part of Treasury assistance 
came in January 2009, when the Treasury 
advanced $20 billion each to Citibank and  
Bank of America.  These loans were short- 
lived:  Both were repaid in full by December 
2009.  (In addition, the Treasury received  
$3 billion in interest.
6) 
In the third part, also in January 2009, the 
Treasury, Federal Reserve and FDIC jointly 
guaranteed losses on $118 billion and $301 
billion of shaky assets held, respectively, by 
Bank of America and Citicorp.  Again, the 
assistance was short-lived:  Bank of America 
terminated the agreement six months later, 
paying the Treasury a $425 million termina-
tion fee despite never having received any 
funds from the Treasury.  Citicorp’s guaran-
tee line remains open.  At inception, to secure 
the guarantee, Citicorp paid the Treasury 
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cent dividend), plus warrants for 66.5 million 
common shares.  Through Sept. 30, 2010, the 
Treasury had received $440 million in stock 
dividends from Citicorp, despite Citicorp not 
requesting any funds from the Treasury, and 
the sale of the common shares is expected to 
bring a profit of $12 billion.
7
The Federal Reserve’s largest lending 
program was the Term Auction Facility 
(TAF), which auctioned to banks each week 
the right to borrow funds from the Federal 
Reserve.  All borrowing was fully collateral-
ized, the Fed incurred no risk and suffered 
no losses, and there were no expenditures 
except administrative costs—hence, the TAF 
is not included in Figure 1.  The TAF began 
December 2007 and ended April 2010. 
Perhaps the Fed’s most controversial 
program was Maiden Lane I (ML I), created 
March 14, 2008, to assist the acquisition by 
J.P. Morgan Chase (JPMC) of the failed Bear 
Stearns and Co.  Regulators believed that 
financial markets would be harmed griev-
ously if Bear Stearns’ primary businesses 
(collateral and market-clearing services, 
particularly for Far East customers) were 
unavailable on that Monday morning.  Some 
$30 billion of Bear Stearns’ shakiest assets 
were placed into ML I, funded by a loan 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.   
It was agreed that JPMC would absorb the 
first $1 billion of losses on these assets, with 
the Fed absorbing the excess.  Valued at 
market prices as of Nov. 17, the value of the 
assets is more than sufficient to repay 100 
percent of its loan to the New York Fed and 
94 percent to JPMC.
Assistance to Insurance Companies
The Treasury and the Federal Reserve 
assisted a number of insurance companies 
—most visibly AIG.  Assistance to firms 
other than AIG consisted largely of the 
Federal Reserve strengthening market  
confidence in the firms by approving 
their applications to become bank hold-
ing companies.  For AIG, assistance began 
in September 2008 with a collateralized 
Federal Reserve loan of $85 billion.  On 
Nov. 25, 2008, the Treasury bought $40 
billion of newly issued AIG preferred stock, 
the proceeds used to repay a portion of 
the Federal Reserve loan.  On April 17, 
2009, the Treasury created a $29.8 billion 
equity capital facility for AIG, of which the 
firm has drawn one-quarter.  As of Sept. 
30, 2010, the Treasury’s assistance to AIG 
was $69.8 billion.  In exchange, Treasury 
held a 79 percent ownership stake and had 
announced its intention to increase its stake 
to 92 percent through a conversion of debt 
and preferred shares to common equity.
The Federal Reserve also assisted AIG 
during the autumn of 2008 via the creation 
of the special purpose firms Maiden Lane 
II and III.  Using $70 billion borrowed 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, these firms strengthened AIG by 
buying certain shaky AIG liabilities.  (ML 
II assumed the remainder of the Septem-
ber 2008 loan; ML III bought certain 
AIG liabilities in the open market.)  As of 
November 2010, both Maiden Lane II and 
III showed profits on their investments 
due to increased market prices of the  
purchased assets.  
Analysts differ widely regarding the 
Treasury’s likely recovery of its assistance 
to AIG; how much is recovered depends on 
projections for AIG’s earnings and stock 
price.  If the Treasury sells eventually its 
common equity at the current market price 
of AIG common stock (approximately $40  
a share), the net loss might be as small as  
$5 billion.  More-pessimistic projections  
are a loss of $25 billion.
Was assistance to AIG wise?  Assistance 
shielded customers, including thousands  
of households and both large and small 
businesses (many U.S. taxpayers), from  
disruption and loss.  Assuming the Trea-
sury converts its debt to equity, AIG’s 
extant shareholders will hold only 8 
percent.  Senior management has resigned.  
AIG’s bondholders, however, certainly 
benefited from the firm’s avoidance of 
bankruptcy. 
Assistance to Fannie, Freddie 
The Treasury’s most expensive program  
to date is assistance to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, which were placed into 
conservatorship Sept. 7, 2008, after losses 
overwhelmed their small capital bases.  
The Treasury has injected capital by buy-
ing newly issued senior preferred stock.  
As of June 30, 2010, the Treasury had 
invested $148 billion, roughly equal to the 
firms’ losses.
8  Recent best- and worst-case 
projections, respectively, are for addi-
tional Treasury purchases of between 
$73 billion and $215 billion, with a net 
loss to the Treasury through 2013 of 
between $135 billion and $259 billion. 
Treasury’s assistance did not bail out 
the firms’ owners.  Shareholders’ $36 bil-
lion in equity held at the time of conser-
vatorship is now worthless; the primary 
losers are smaller commercial banks and 
retirement/pension funds.  No losses 
were imposed, however, on holders of the 
firms’ debt ($1.8 billion) and guaranteed 
mortgage-backed securities ($3.8 billion); 
these owners include households, state 
and local governments, banks, security 
brokers, insurance companies, and pen-
sion and mutual funds.
Assistance to the Auto Industry 
9 
The Treasury assisted both General 
Motors and Chrysler during 2008.  Critics 
of assistance argued that these firms were 
ill-managed and should cease operation.  
Supporters argued that up to 3 million jobs 
would be lost if the firms closed and that 
a decade might pass before these workers 
would become re-employed.  For GM, the 
Treasury lent $49.5 billion in exchange 
for $6.7 billion in debt (now repaid), $2.1 
billion in preferred stock and a 61 percent 
common equity stake.  For Chrysler, the 
Treasury lent $12.5 billion and received a 
9.9 percent common equity stake.  
The Treasury also assisted auto-lending 
firms GMAC (now Ally Financial) and 
Chrysler Financial.  The Treasury lent 
GMAC $17.2 billion in exchange for a 56.3 
percent common equity stake, $2.7 billion 
in trust preferred securities and $11.4 bil-
lion in preferred shares.  The Treasury lent 
$1.5 billion to Chrysler Financial, which 
Was assistance to AiG wise?  
Assistance shielded custom-
ers, including thousands of 
households and both large 
and small businesses (many 
U.s. taxpayers), from disrup-
tion and loss.
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*Seasonally Adjusted at an Annual Rate
sources: bureau of economic analysis, bureau of labor statistics, 
blinder and Zandi (2010)
note: special lending programs include government programs not 
included in this article, such as the Federal reserve’s purchase of 
government-sponsored enterprise (Gse) debt and mortgage-backed 
securities (Mbs). 
Did the “Bailouts” Save the Economy?
figure 2 
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H
istorical experience suggests that
recessions associated with a 
financial crisis tend to be more severe 
and prolonged than other recessions.12  
recoveries tend to be slow due to weak 
demand, tight credit conditions and slug-
gish growth in residential investment.  
When recessions around the world are 
highly synchronized, these problems are 
exacerbated.
According to the international Monetary 
fund, both monetary and fiscal stimulus 
tend to shorten the duration of reces-
sions, although the impact of “traditional” 
monetary policy (reductions in the fed 
funds rate) is insignificant.  Historical case 
studies cannot give precise estimates of 
extraordinary measures taken to combat 
the recent financial crisis and recession.  
Economists can, however, use econome-
tric techniques to obtain estimates of the 
impact of these programs.  for example, 
economists Alan Blinder and Mark Zandi 
estimate that without any government 
intervention twice as many jobs (16 million 
versus 8 million) would have been lost 
during the recession and that real GDP 
would have declined for another year.  
figure 2 plots Blinder and Zandi’s results 
for real GDP growth, the unemployment 
rate and consumer price inflation.
in each chart, the solid black line 
depicts the actual data, as reported by 
recession Could Have Been Much Worse
PHoto © Grasco/sHutterstock iMaGes
the official sources (the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and the Bureau of 
Labor statistics).  The red line is the 
baseline scenario from the model; this 
simulation is designed to reflect what 
actually occurred.  The baseline sce-
nario matches the trends in the actual 
data, verifying the model’s ability to 
simulate the real economy.  The blue 
line in each chart depicts a scenario in 
which the government does nothing:  
no special lending programs focused 
on the financial markets, and no fiscal 
stimulus package.  Under this scenario, 
real GDP growth remains negative 
through 2010, the unemployment rate 
tops 16 percent and the economy 
experiences prolonged deflation.  The 
two other scenarios assume only one 
of the two government initiatives were 
taken: special lending programs and 
no stimulus (green line), or stimulus 
and no special lending programs 
(purple line).
The data in the charts indicate that 
the special lending programs had 
greater impact on the overall economy 
than the fiscal stimulus did.  Blinder 
and Zandi note, however, that “the 
combined effects of the financial and 
fiscal policies exceed the sum [of the 
programs in isolation]” by reinforcing 
each other.13was fully repaid in July 2009.  
The Treasury’s assistance did not bail out 
the owners—all shareholders’ equity in the 
old GM and Chrysler was extinguished in 
bankruptcy.  Owners of bonds—individuals 
and institutions—also suffered losses  
in bankruptcy, averaging approximately  
70 percent of their investments.  
In total, the Treasury assisted the indus-
try with $81.7 billion, of which $11.2 billion 
had been repaid and $2.9 billion had been 
received in dividends, interest and fees 
as of Sept. 30.  The Treasury recouped an 
additional $14 billion from GM’s public 
stock offering in November.  The projected 
eventual loss on auto industry assistance  
is $17 billion.  Although a profit on GM is 
possible, this depends on the stock’s price  
at the time of sale.  The Treasury’s break-
even price, relative to the assistance pro-
vided, is roughly $57 per share.
Assistance to Homeowners
Potentially the Treasury’s second most 
expensive programs (after Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) are the homeowner support  
programs, for which the Treasury has 
pledged $45.6 billion to foreclosure mitiga-
tion.
10  As of Sept. 30, 2010, some 207,000 
permanent loan modifications had been com-
pleted at a cost of $540 million.  Although 
individual mortgage borrowers are the 
program’s most visible beneficiaries, perhaps 
equally important are the holders of the 
related mortgage-backed securities:  They 
risk losses as high as 70 percent if properties 
are foreclosed.  Ironically, the largest single 
amount (more than $7.5 billion) has been 
pledged to Countrywide Home Loans Servic-
ing and to Bank of America, both previously  
large subprime lenders.
11  Because this pro-
gram’s funds assist borrowers to make perma-
nent changes in their mortgages, the Treasury 
does not anticipate recovering the funds.
What is the Bottom Line? 
Both Federal Reserve and FDIC assistance 
programs have earned net profits.  Small 
losses on some programs have been more 
than offset by earnings elsewhere, including 
Maiden Lane III and the interest received 
by the Fed on loans to banks.  (We do not 
include Federal Reserve earnings beginning 
March 2009 on its quantitative easing.)  
The FDIC has received guarantee fees and 
increased insurance premiums on demand 
deposits, with minimal expenditures. 
The Treasury anticipates small profits 
on some programs (see Figure 1), more 
than offset by losses on the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and assistance 
to individual homeowners.  Excluding 
housing-related programs, recent estimates 
are that the Treasury will likely recover 90 
to 95 percent of assistance funds, the largest 
uncertainty being the sale price of its shares 
in GM and AIG.
too Much or too Little?
An evaluation of the role of government 
assistance must look beyond taxpayers’ 
profits or losses.  Large-scale assistance stirs 
debate regarding both moral hazard and the 
fundamental role of government, although 
at times, financial crisis seems forgotten.  
Disparate views are highlighted by U.S. 
Rep. Erik Paulsen, R-Minn., and former 
U.S. Sen. Robert Bennett, R-Utah.  The first 
argued, “We would be much better-served if 
private institutions either fail or be success-
ful on their own,” while the senator argued, 
“[TARP] did save the world from a financial 
meltdown. ... Even if it did not all get paid 
back, it was still the [right] thing to do.”
The ultimate judgment must come down  
to two factors:
1)  Did the assistance prevent a 1930s-scale 
collapse (see sidebar on Page 9)? and 
2)  In complex financial markets, where 
taxpayers are employees, owners, customers 
and creditors of both firms and the GSEs, 
who is really being “bailed out”?  Corpo-
rate “bailouts” benefited debt holders—for 
example, pension funds and 401(k)s; home-
owner “bailouts” benefited investors who had 
bought risky mortgage-backed securities.  
Although the jury is out on definitive 
answers to these questions, the consensus 
that emerges will determine the tools avail-
able to the government and Federal Reserve 
during the next financial crisis. 
Richard G. Anderson is an economist and 
Charles S. Gascon is the research support  
coordinator at the Federal Reserve Bank of  
St. Louis.  See http://research.stlouisfed.org/
econ/anderson/ for more on Anderson’s work.
continued from Page 8
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E n dno t E s
  1  Bagehot often is misquoted as arguing the 
opposite.  See Anderson.
  2  The exceptions are $21 billion, primarily from 
the TALF program, that provided general sup-
port to auto, student and small-business loan 
securitization markets. 
  3  The two programs are the Transaction 
Account Guarantee Program and Debt  
Guarantee Program, respectively.
  4  Due to changing economic conditions and 
the restructuring of existing programs, there 
is margin for error around these projections.  
Moreover, the complexities in each program 
have led to varying methodologies and  
different results.  Details can be obtained from 
the publicly available reports cited.
  5  This program is the Capital Purchase 
Program.  See U.S. Treasury (2010a).
  6  This program is the Targeted Investment 
Program.  See U.S. Treasury (2010a).
  7  This program is the Asset Guarantee Program.  
See U.S. Treasury (2010a).
  8  This is the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase 
Agreement.
  9  This is the Automotive Industry Financing Pro-
gram, which includes the Auto Supplier Support 
Program and the Auto Warranty Commitment 
Program.  See U.S. Treasury (2010a).
  10 A number of separate initiatives lie under 
this banner, including the Home Afford-
able Modification Program, the Second-Lien 
Modification Program, the Home Affordable 
Foreclosure Alternatives, the Home Affordable 
Unemployment Program and the Principal 
Reduction Alternative program.  See Office of 
the Special Inspector General.
  11 The predatory behavior of Countrywide Mort-
gage prior to June 2008 is well-documented.  
For example, on June 7, 2010, the Federal Trade 
Commission announced a $108 million settle-
ment with Countrywide with respect to exces-
sive fees charged to struggling homeowners and 
mishandling of loan documents. 
  12 See IMF.
  13 See Blinder and Zandi.
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